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Abstract 
What is it like to have a body?  The present study takes a psychometric approach to this 
question.  We collected structured introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion, to 
systematically investigate the structure of bodily self-consciousness.  Participants observed a 
rubber hand that was stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own hand and 
then made proprioceptive judgments of the location of their own hand and used Likert scales to 
rate their agreement or disagreement with 27 statements relating to their subjective experience of 
the illusion.  Principal components analysis of this data revealed four major components of the 
experience across conditions, which we interpret as: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own 
hand, movement, and affect.  In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, 
deafference, was found.  Secondary analysis of the embodiment of rubber hand component 
revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency.  The 
ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive 
biases induced by the illusion.  These results suggest that psychometric tools may provide a rich 
method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an 
empirically rigorous phenomenology. 
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What is Embodiment? A Psychometric Approach 
 
 What is it like to have a body?  The sense of one’s own body, variously termed 
“embodiment” (Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke, 2006), “coenaesthesia” (Critchley, 1953), 
“bodily self-consciousness” (Bermúdez, 1998; Legrand, 2006), or “corporeal awareness” 
(Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; Critchley, 1979), has often been described as a non-conceptual, 
somatic, form of knowledge, different in kind from other types of knowledge (e.g., Kant, 
1781/2003; Bermúdez).  In addition, many authors have suggested embodiment is a necessary 
prerequisite for other types of sensation and knowledge (Kant; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; Piaget, 1937/1954).  On that view, embodiment would be the 
cornerstone of mental life, the “storm-center” of experience as James (1905) put it.  The sense of 
one’s own body is also intimately related to the sense of self, and is often taken as the starting 
point of individual psychological identity (Cassam, 1997; Edelman, 2004).  However, recognition 
of the importance of embodiment has not been matched by theoretical clarity about what 
embodiment is or involves.  Neurological and neuropsychological investigations have generally 
provided a framework for embodiment by proposing dissociations between different 
subcomponents of body representation, such as body image and body schema (e.g, Gallagher & 
Cole, 1995; see also Head & Holmes, 1911/1912).  Use of these terms, however, has been 
plagued by confusion, disagreement, and inconsistent usage (cf. Gallagher, 2005; Poeck & 
Orgass, 1971).  This confusion arises in part because the sense of embodiment is both rich and 
complex on the one hand, and elusive and hard to describe on the other (Gallagher, 2005; 
Haggard & Wolpert, 2005). 
The phenomenological tradition, has provided rich descriptive characterizations of 
embodiment, and has used it as a starting point for theories of the self (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 
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1945/1962).  However, it has not offered the operational working definitions and measures 
needed for rigorous empirical research.  What is needed is a more systematic, and principled 
approach to decomposing the bodily self.  Such a project should have two aims.  First, it should  
produce theoretically useful and clearly dissociable subcomponents of embodiment.  Second, it 
should generate testable predictions about human experience which can be directly measured. 
The present study provides an initial step towards these goals, by applying psychometric methods 
to structured introspective reports of a conscious experience of embodiment.  If embodiment is a 
coherent psychological construct, rigorous measurement and analysis should clarify what it is, 
and what its subcomponents are.   
Embodiment is clearly a kind of experience, but psychology’s traditional methods of 
studying experience have difficulty in capturing its nature.  On the one hand, the introspectionist 
approach seems unsuitable because one’s body so often forms the background of mental life 
rather than the foreground.  In addition, the verbal labels that people most readily use when 
describing the body enumerate the different physical parts of the body, but not the experience that 
those parts jointly constitute the self (de Vignemont, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2005).  The objective 
methods of psychophysics successfully capture the occurrence and magnitude of a single 
identifiable experience or quale (e.g., whether a stimulus is red or green in colour), but do not 
easily capture more complex experiences such as the sense of one’s own body. 
 An ideal experimental approach to embodiment would involve comparing one condition 
in which a participant has a body, and another in which they do not.  But such ‘brain in a vat’ 
experiments are confined to philosophy (Putnam, 1982), because the body is “always there” 
(James, 1890).  Nevertheless, it is possible to manipulate the perceived incorporation of an 
external object into the representation of the body.  In the so-called rubber hand illusion, for 
example, a prosthetic hand brushed synchronously with a participant’s own hand is perceived as 
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actually being part of the participant’s own body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005).  The same visual and tactile stimulation delivered asynchronously has a quite different 
phenomenology.  The rubber hand illusion provides one of the few means of manipulating 
embodiment, and has been so used in a number of recent studies (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; 
Austen, Soto-Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone, 2004; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Durgin et al., 2007; 
Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Ehrsson et al., 
2007; Farnè et al., 2000; Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Kanayama, Sato, & Ohira, 2007; 
Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000; Press, Heyes, Haggard, & Eimer, in press; Rorden, Heutink, 
Greenfield, & Robertson, 1999; Schaefer, Flor, Heinze, & Rotte, 2006; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007a; Walton & Spence, 2004).  
However, most studies simply report the occurrence of the illusion, or a behavioural or neural 
proxy of it such as a change in the perceived position of the participant’s own hand, without 
systematic description or quantitative measurement of the changed sense of embodiment. 
In this study, we investigate the structure of embodiment by taking a psychometric 
approach to introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion.  Participants observed a rubber hand 
that was stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own hand and then made 
proprioceptive judgments of the location of their own hand and used a Likert scale to rate their 
agreement or disagreement with 27 statements relating to their subjective experience of the 
illusion.  We used a classic factor analytic approach, based on principal components analysis 
(PCA), to investigate the latent structure of participants’ experience, and to quantify the complex 
experience of embodiment. 
Method 
Participants 
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 One hundred and thirty one current and prospective students (75 female) at University 
College London participated with local ethical approval.  All but six were right handed, as 
assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), M: 71.62, range: -90.91 – 100.  
Participants were recruited at open days offered by the University and volunteered to participate.  
There were no restrictions on participation. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 Participants sat at a table across from the experimenter, with their stimulated hand placed 
inside a specially constructed box.  There were separate boxes for the right- and left-hand 
stimulation groups, which were mirror reflections of each other.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the right- (N = 67) or left-hand (N = 64) apparatus.  The boxes measured 36.5 
cm in width, 19 cm in height, and 29 cm in depth.  One hole was cut in front, through which the 
participant placed their hand; another was cut on top, through which the participant could see the 
rubber hand; and most of the back of the box was removed, allowing the experimenter to brush 
both hands.  The inside of the box was lined with grey felt, and a small Velcro disk indicated 
where the tip of the participant’s index finger should be placed.  A black cover (59.5 cm by 29 
cm) was connected to the box by two hinges.  When the cover was open, the rubber hand could 
be seen by the participant, but the experimenter was hidden from view; when it was closed, the 
opposite was true.  Participants wore a cloth smock which was attached to the front edge of the 
box, such that their arms were out of view throughout the experiment.  The rubber hands were 
life sized prosthetic hands, one of a right hand, the other of a left hand. 
Procedure 
 The experiment consisted of two blocks.  At the beginning of each block the experimenter 
made sure the cover was lowered and asked the participant to place the appropriate hand inside 
the box, with the tip of their index finger resting on the Velcro disk.  A pre-test proprioceptive 
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location judgment was obtained by asking the participant to indicate where it felt like the tip of 
their index finger was located by reporting the corresponding number along a ruler laid across the 
box top, parallel to their frontal plane.  A random ruler offset that varied from trial to trial was 
used to discourage participants from re-using remembered verbal labels from prior trials. 
Following the pretest judgment, the cover was raised and a 60 second induction phase 
began in which both the rubber hand and the participant’s hand were brushed with two identical 
paintbrushes (Winsor & Newton, London).  In the synchronous condition, the hands were 
brushed at the same time, while in the asynchronous condition they were brushed 180˚ out of 
phase.  The order of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions was alternated across 
participants. Sixty-six participants completed the synchronous condition first; sixty-five 
completed the asynchronous condition first.  Brush strokes were made at approximately 1 Hz. 
 After the induction, the cover was lowered and a post-test proprioceptive location 
judgment was made in the same manner as the pre-test.  Following this proprioceptive judgment, 
participants were asked to remove their hand from the box and the questionnaire was 
administered.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement 
with 27 statements in each block, using a 7-item Likert scale.  A response of +3 indicated that 
they “strongly agreed” with the statement, -3 that they “strongly disagreed”, and 0 that they 
“neither agreed nor disagreed”, though any intermediate value could be used.  Before the 
questionnaire in the first block, the scale was explained to the participant.  A sheet of paper 
showing the scale and the 7 possible responses was placed on the box in front of the participant 
throughout the questionnaire.  The first two items presented were always items (20 and 21) 
relating to the experience being interesting and enjoyable; the order of subsequent items was 
randomized separately for each participant in each condition. 
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 We used more questionnaire items than previous studies of rubber hand illusion studies 
(typically 8-10).  We designed 27 items based on qualitiative research with five participants, who 
were asked to freely report their experiences during the illusion.  Analysis of these transcripts 
motivated a selection of questionnaire items.  The items covered a wide range of themes, and 
were designed to reflect many types of possible experiences participants might have, including 
hypothesized constructs such as the senses of ownership and agency over the body (cf. Gallagher, 
2000; Tsakiris et al., 2006).   
Results 
The mean and standard deviation for the raw item scores in each condition are given in 
supplementary table 1. 
Structure Underlying Subjective Reports 
PCA with varimax orthogonal rotation was used to investigate the structure of experience 
of the rubber hand illusion.  Separate PCAs were conducted for the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions.  In the synchronous condition, analysis of the scree plot and 
eigenvalues led to the extraction of four components which together accounted for 55.3% of 
variance in the data (see Table 1).  The first component, which accounted for substantially more 
variance than any other (26.3%), we termed embodiment of rubber hand.  It comprised items 
relating to the feelings that: the rubber hand belonged to the participant, the participant had 
control over the rubber hand, the rubber hand and real hand were in the same location, and the 
rubber hand had taken on features of the actual hand (items 1-10).  The second component we 
termed loss of own hand.  Items loading on this component related to the feelings of: being 
unable to move one’s hand, one’s hand disappearing, and one’s hand being out of one’s control.  
The third component we termed movement; it was comprised of two items relating to perceived 
motion of one’s own hand, and to movement of the rubber hand.  The fourth component we 
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termed affect; items loading on this component included items relating to the experience in the 
block being interesting and enjoyable, and the touch of the paintbrush being pleasant (cf. 
affective touch, Rolls et al., 2003).  Further components consisted of single items, and were 
therefore judged uninformative. 
 A similar analysis of the asynchronous condition led to the extraction of five components, 
together accounting for 59.4% of the variance in the data.  The same four components appeared 
in this data, and again the embodiment component accounted for the bulk of the variance 
(24.6%).  However, the major difference was that an entirely new component appeared, which we 
termed deafference.  This related to the sensation of pins-and-needles and numbness in one’s 
hand, and the experience of the hand being less vivid than normal.  The order of the other 
components was slightly different than in the synchronous condition, but the importance of each 
component, as indexed by the proportion of variance explained, was comparable.  The presence 
of the same four components in the two conditions provides convergent evidence that the PCAs 
are reliably decomposing the structure of bodily experience.  The emergence of an additional 
component in the asynchronous condition only suggests that the structure underlying conscious 
experience in the two conditions, while similar, is not identical. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
The embodiment of rubber hand component accounted for a large proportion of variance 
in both conditions and was composed of diverse items.  We therefore suspected that further 
structure might exist within this component, but had been masked by the subcomponents’ mutual 
similarity relative to other components extracted in our first analysis.  We therefore conducted 
additional PCAs on only those items loading strongly (> 0.50; cf. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, 
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& Tatham, 2006; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) on the embodiment of rubber hand component, 
both in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.  Ten such items were identified (1-10).  
For both synchronous and asynchronous conditions three subcomponents of embodiment of 
rubber hand were identified, together account for 79.0% and 76.2% of the variance in the two 
conditions, respectively.  We termed these the senses of ownership, location, and agency (see 
Table 2).  Ownership comprised a large portion of the variance (35.4% and 34.3% in the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions, respectively), and was composed of items related to 
the feeling that the rubber hand was part of one’s body, the feeling of looking directly at one’s 
hand, and the rubber hand taking on the characteristics of one’s own hand.  Location related to 
the feeling that the rubber hand and one’s own hand were in the same place, and also to 
sensations of causation between the seen and felt touches.  Agency related to the feelings of being 
able to move the rubber hand, and control over it.  This is in contrast to the loss of own hand 
component which emerged in the primary analysis, which included feelings of lack of agency 
over one’s own hand.  Thus, while these three components of experience bundled together in the 
primary analysis, suggesting that they are tightly interrelated in experience, more focused 
analysis was able to separate them, suggesting that they are dissociable components of 
experience. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Presence and Absence of Experiences 
Having established the similar structure of experience in synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions, we next quantified the presence or absence of each component of experience in each 
condition.  We therefore calculated component scores for each component in each condition by 
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multiplying the orthogonal scoring coefficients for each item by each participant’s response.  The 
component scores effectively express the value of each latent variable as if they were being 
measured directly from each participant using the same Likert scale used to respond to individual 
items.  An ANOVA was run on these component scores with condition (synchronous, 
asynchronous) and primary component (embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, 
movement, affect) as within-subjects factors (see Figure 1).  There was a significant main effect 
of component, F(3, 390) = 107.41, p < .0001, suggesting that these aspects of experience were 
differentially present.  There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 130) = 29.05, p 
< .0001.  More importantly, we found a significant interaction of the two factors, F(3, 390) = 
69.24, p < .0001, indicating that the effects of synchronous stroking did not influence all aspects 
of experience in the same way. 
 Inspection of the component scores showed that these were significantly higher following 
synchronous than asynchronous stroking for the embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, 
and affect components.  However, this relation was reversed for the movement component, with 
synchronous  stroking showing a score significantly more negative than asynchronous (see Figure 
for stats).  
In the case of the affect and movement components, synchronous stroking simply 
exaggerated the effects of asynchronous stroking, whether they were positive or negative 
respectively.  That is, synchrony sharpened these aspects of experience, but did not qualitatively 
alter them.  In contrast, component scores for embodiment of rubber hand were significantly 
positive following synchronous stroking, but significantly negative following asynchronous 
stroking.  This suggests that the rubber hand illusion selectively inverts the sense of embodiment 
concerning the rubber hand.  On average, participants had the sense that the rubber hand was part 
of their body in the synchronous – but not the asynchronous – condition. 
Psychometrics of Embodiment 
 12 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
 We took the same approach to investigate the presence or absence of the three sub-
components of embodiment (ownership, location, agency; see Figure 2).  There was a significant 
main effect of component, F(2, 260) = 11.26, p < .0001, suggesting that these aspects of 
experience were differentially present.  There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 
130) = 110.69, p < .0001, and a significant interaction of the two factors, F(2, 260) = 3.60, p < 
.05.  This interaction suggests that multisensory synchrony differentially affected these three 
aspects of experience.  Component scores for ownership and location were positive following 
synchronous stroking, but negative following asynchronous stroking.  Agency scores were 
negative in both conditions, which was predicted since neither the participant’s hand nor the 
rubber hand moved at any time.  In summary, two specific aspects of embodiment are 
manipulated in the rubber hand illusion.  These are the sense of ownership of the rubber hand and 
perceived location of the hand.  The presence of ownership following synchronous stimulation 
does not necessarily cause a corresponding positive sense of agency, suggesting that these are 
dissociable aspects of experience (cf. Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, in 
press; Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
 We ran an additional ANOVA on the top-level component structure including sex 
(female, male) and rubber hand laterality (left, right) as additional factors.  There was a 
significant main effect of sex, F(1, 127) = 4.06, p < .05, with females showing significantly more 
agreement with questionnaire items generally (-.055), than males (-.324), consistent with findings 
that females are, on average, slightly more suggestible than males (e.g., Page & Green, 2007).  
This effect of sex did not interact, however, with component or synchrony, suggesting that it is 
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not related to the rubber hand illusion, or to embodiment.  There were no other main effects or 
interactions involving sex or rubber hand laterality, suggesting that these factors do not strongly 
influence the rubber hand illusion. 
Proprioceptive Judgments 
 Proprioceptive judgments from 11 participants were missing or unusable due to 
experimenter error or failure of participants to follow instructions.  Judgments at pretest showed a 
significant bias towards the body midline across conditions (0.58 cm), t(119) = 2.43, p < .05, (cf. 
Ghilardi, Gordon, & Ghez, 1995).  A significant further displacement towards the rubber hand 
was observed at post-test following synchronous stroking (1.34 cm), t(119) = 4.56, p < .0001, but 
not asynchronous stroking (0.30 cm), t(119) = 1.20, n.s.  The difference between conditions was 
also significant; t(119) = 3.22, p < .005. 
Relations between Objective and Subjective Measures 
To investigate the relation between subjective experience and proprioceptive 
displacement we conducted a multiple linear regression on the difference in proprioceptive 
displacement between synchronous and asynchronous conditions, with the corresponding 
differences for each orthogonal component score as regressors.  Embodiment of rubber hand 
significantly predicted the proprioceptive displacement, β = 0.609, t(115) = 3.40, p < .001, and 
movement had a marginal effect, β = 0.290, t(115) = 1.68, p = .096, but the loss of own hand and 
affect components did not significantly predict proprioceptive displacement, β = -.128, .087, 
t(115) = -.76, .32, respectively.  As the deafference component appeared only in the 
asynchronous condition, an additional regression analysis was conducted on this component.  
Deafference was not a significant predictor of proprioceptive biases in the asynchronous 
condition, β = -.034, t(118) = -.53, p > .20. 
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 Given that embodiment of rubber hand as a whole is significantly related to 
proprioceptive displacement, in the rubber hand illusion, we also investigated which of its 
subcomponents are driving this effect, again using multiple linear regression.  Unsurprisingly, the 
location subcomponent was a significant predictor of prioprioceptive displacement, β = .485, 
t(116) = 3.02, p < .005.  More interestingly, the ownership subcomponent also independently 
predicted proprioceptive drift, β = .425, t(116) = 2.85, p < .01, whereas the agency subcomponent 
did not, β = .110, t(116) = .75, p > .20.  Proprioceptive displacement therefore appears to be a 
genuine by-product of embodiment, but also related specifically to body ownership, but not 
agency. 
Discussion 
 To our knowledge, the present findings represent the first systematic attempt to measure 
embodiment.  By combining an experimental manipulation of the experience of one’s own body, 
and a structured psychometric approach to measuring that experience, we were able to 
characterize what sort of experience embodiment is, and decompose it into sub-aspects.  These 
results suggest that psychometric methods can be useful tools in elucidating structure underlying 
complex conscious experience.  Specifically, we identified four components that emerged in both 
conditions: embodiment of rubber hand (which itself was composed of subcomponents relating to 
ownership, location, and agency), loss of own hand, movement, and affect.  While each of these 
components was part of the structure of experience of both conditions, the conditions differed in 
terms of the extent to which each component was present or absent.  Furthermore, an additional 
component, deafference, emerged only in the asynchronous condition.  This pattern represents the 
characteristic structure of the rubber hand illusion, one of the few experimental models of 
embodiment. 
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 While the analysis of embodiment we report here may be incomplete, and may not 
generalise to all ‘embodied’ experience, the structure we found is broadly consistent with results 
of previous experimental and conceptual work on embodiment.  We provided the first direct 
empirical evidence confirming the intuition that body ownership and agency reflect dissociable 
components of embodiment (cf. Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., in press; Tsakiris et al., 2006).  
Our results, furthermore, support the claim that affect associated with somatic sensations is 
separable from other forms of afferent input (cf. Rolls et al., 2003), as the pleasantness of touch 
loaded on the affect component, whereas the sense of causation associated with touch loaded on 
the location component  Additionally, however, our results also provide several novel insights.  
We particularly focus on three aspects of the substructure of the experience of the rubber hand 
illusion which were not predictable from previous experimental studies. 
Displacement of Participant’s Own Hand by the Rubber Hand 
First, while the focus of prior studies on the rubber hand illusion has been on feelings 
about the rubber hand, we identified important changes in feelings about the participant’s own 
hand.  Specifically, this component related to items reflecting paralysis of the hand, and its 
disappearance.  This latent variable was significantly more present following synchronous than 
asynchronous stroking.  This suggests that rather that simply being incorporated as part of the 
body, the rubber hand may in some sense displace the participant’s actual hand.  This overwriting 
of an existing body part by an incorporated object has important implications for plasticity of 
body representations.  It confirms the intuition that the external object becomes a substitute for, 
and a part of, the functional self.  But it also suggests that plasticity is constrained by a principle 
of body constancy: the novel rubber hand is incorporated by functionally suppressing the existing 
hand, rather than by adding an additional ‘supernumerary’ hand (McGonigle et al., 2002).  
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Furthermore, the participant’s own hand is felt to disappear.  This suggests that the rubber hand 
actively displaces the actual hand, rather than merely being mistaken for it. 
Dissociation of Ownership and Perceived Location 
Second, the experience of the location of one’s own hand relative to the rubber hand was 
dissociable from the sense of ownership over the hand.  This finding stands in contrast to theories 
which make location a constitutive component of selfhood.  Jeannerod (2007), for example, 
argues that others are perceived as rotated-selves, such that the self’s being ‘here’ and the other 
‘there’ is the crucial distinction allowing them to be differentiated.  The present dissociation of 
body ownership and location suggests that ‘me-ness’ is not reducible to ‘here-ness’.  Despite 
these components being dissociable, they are generally strongly linked in most experience.  
Indeed, ownership and location were merged in our primary PCA, and separated only at a 
secondary stage, suggesting that these components are highly correlated.  Thus, even if the sense 
of self is not intrinsically reducible to perceived location, the correlation between these 
components of experience might normally be sufficient to differentiate self from other in practice 
(Jeannerod, 2007). 
Having separated the ownership and location components, our analyses further showed 
that somatic sensory experiences are tied to location, not to ownership.  Specifically, the feeling 
that the brushstrokes observed on the rubber hand had caused the feeling of being stroked loaded 
on location, rather than ownership.  This suggests the possibility of sensory perception in a body 
part that is not perceived as being one’s own.  Indeed, this precise dissociation has been described 
in neurological cases, such as the somatoparaphrenic patient of Aglioti, Smania, Manfredi, and 
Berlucchi (1996).  This patient denied ownership of her left hand in the acute phase following a 
right parietal stroke, but nevertheless reported feeling touches on the very hand that she claimed 
was not hers.  Similar findings have been reported by Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, and Vallar (2002)
1
.  
Psychometrics of Embodiment 
 17 
Our analysis supports the concept that tactile sensations can be dissociated from ownership of the 
limb on which they are felt to occur.   
Sensory Conflict and Deafference 
Third, while the asynchronous stroking condition has generally been regarded as a control 
condition, we found an entirely new component of experience that emerged only in that 
condition.  This latent variable related to afferent information from the participant’s own hand, 
and recalls Jackson and Zangwill’s (1952) finding that participants asked to move their fingers 
while looking at a mirrored reflection of their own hand often reported sensations that their hand 
was “isolated” or “detached from sensations of movement”.  Similarly, McCabe, Haigh, Halligan, 
and Blake (2005) reported that visuo-proprioceptive-motor conflict created with mirrors led 
participants to report several strange sensations, notably including numbness and pins-and-
needles.  We suggest that intersensory conflict in the asynchronous condition may create a form 
of deafferentation.  For example, a visually-driven gating mechanism might suppress 
transmission or interpretation of conflicting afferent information (cf. Press et al., in press).  
Interestingly, the asynchronous condition can only be conceived of as involving conflict to the 
extent that some rudimentary form of ownership of the rubber hand is elicited merely from the 
visual perception of the rubber hand (at least when it is in plausible alignment with the 
participant’s actual hand).  Indeed, while some studies have found synchronous stimulation to be 
necessary to elicit the rubber hand illusion (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), others have found 
significant effects of the rubber hand in conditions where no brushing of either hand ever took 
place (e.g., Pavani et al., 2000; Farnè et al., 2000).  This suggests that there are at least two types 
of cause of the rubber hand illusion: purely visual information from the perception of the hand in 
plausible configuration, and multisensory synchrony. 
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Previous psychological accounts of embodiment have accepted the concept of a bodily 
self as obvious and unproblematic (e.g., James, 1890), have linked it to a single somatic sensory 
system such as visceral interoception (e.g., Damasio, 1999), or have assumed a single innate 
capacity for self-representation (e.g, Meltzoff, 2007).  Our study demonstrates for the first time 
that experience of one’s own body is not a single dimension, but a composite of several different 
subjective components, organised with a characteristic structure.  Thus, some aspects of 
embodiment clearly reflect bottom-up sensory factors (as captured by our location component), 
while others reflect top-down influences of an explicit model of the body as an object (such as 
our loss of own hand component).  In general, the pattern of latent variables suggests at least two 
types of influences structuring embodiment: those associated with immediate sensations from the 
body and with stored representations of the body, respectively.  This two-level view converges 
with studies which have manipulated independent variables providing information about the 
body, and measured a single behavioural and a single neural dependent variable (e.g., Tsakiris et 
al., 2007a).  Both research approaches suggest that the experience of embodiment emerges from a 
complex interplay of bottom-up and top-down influences. 
Implications for Rubber Hand Illusion Studies 
While the rubber hand illusion is well accepted as an experimental model of embodiment, 
there has been less consensus on how to measure the illusion.  Introspective reports have either 
been difficult to quantify (e.g., Peled et al., 2000), or confined to the mere occurrence of the 
illusion (e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2004).  Proprioceptive biases that occur in the illusion provide a 
useful quantitative proxy, but miss the actual phenomenology entirely.  This study makes a 
bridge between the two, uniting phenomenological richness with experimental rigour.  This richer 
description confirmed significant embodiment of the rubber hand following synchronous – but 
not asynchronous – stroking.  This validates use of the rubber hand illusion as an experimental 
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manipulation of the normal sense of one’s own body.  Furthermore, we found that proprioceptive 
bias linked to the illusion was related specifically to the experience of ownership and of 
perceived location.  Holmes et al. (2006) similarly found that proprioceptive biases correlated 
with questionnaire items relating to the rubber hand being the participant’s hand, but not other 
types of items.  They interpreted this restricted relation as evidence that proprioceptive biases are 
only weakly related to the experience of ownership.  In contrast, we would argue that this is 
evidence of selectivity in this relation, rather than weakness. 
Psychometrics as a Tool for Studying Complex Phenomenology 
The experience of embodiment may seem to be a prototypical instance of an inherently 
private experience, with a first-person ontology.  In contrast, the public data required for rigorous 
science may seem to involve a third-person ontology (cf. Searle, 1994).  Understanding 
experiences such as embodiment by introspection alone is problematic, because of the complexity 
of the experience itself, and because introspectionism cannot provide a clear way to deal with 
differences in reports between participants (e.g., the infamous disagreement regarding imageless 
thought, see Boring, 1953).  Nevertheless, we suggest there is no need to be solipsistic about 
complex experience.  Our psychometric approach works by analyzing correlations between items 
across participants.  To the extent that participants do not agree, no structure should emerge.  
Conversely, to the extent that structure does emerge – as in the present study – it demonstrates 
agreement (however implicit) across participants regarding the structure of their experience. 
Psychometric approaches have been used for at least 100 years to study phenomena as 
diverse as intelligence, attitudes, and consumer preferences, including basic conscious sensations 
such as tastes (e.g., Stevens, Smith, & Lawless, 2006).  Some recent studies have even used 
psychometrics to investigate complex conscious experiences such as the feeling of presence in 
virtual environments (e.g., Witmer, Jerome, & Singer, 2005), and anomalous sensations 
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associated with schizophrenia (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006) and depersonalization (Sierra, 
Baker, Medford, & David, 2005).  To our knowledge, however, this study represents the first 
systematic application of psychometric methods to investigate complex conscious experience 
elicited under controlled, experimental conditions, and to identify subcomponents of that 
experience by systematic questioning.  We validated the use of structured introspective reports as 
a rigorous tool for the study of bodily self-consciousness in two ways: first, by showing that 
systematic structure emerges in the pattern of responses across participants, and that such 
structure is similar across experimental conditions, and second, by showing that individual 
differences between participants were nevertheless related to an objective behavioural measure 
(proprioceptive displacement).  Thus, both similarities across, and differences between 
participants are theoretically meaningful, and show measurable structure.  That comparable 
structure emerged in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions speaks to the reliability 
of our method; that components of experiences are selectively related to proprioceptive biases 
attests to its validity. 
Several limitations of our method and results should be kept in mind.  The selection of 
questionnaire items always restricts the potential structure that can emerge from psychometric 
studies.  If a potential component of the experience of embodiment was not reflected by any of 
the items we used, it could not have emerged in our analysis.  We designed the questionnaire to 
include items relating to a broad range of potential experiences, motivated both theoretically and 
by prior qualitative research.  However,  there are no doubt additional components of 
embodiment which were not covered by our questionnaire.  Second, we have focussed on the 
rubber hand illusion as an initial model for embodiment, because it is subjectively compelling for 
many people, and can elicited under systematically controlled experimental conditions. However, 
the term ‘embodiment’ is used in widely used in modern cognitive science, with a  range of 
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different connotations, often with emphases on affect, sublinguistic thought, or social interaction.  
The psychometric structure found here may or may not generalise to such other instances of 
embodiment.  Indeed, a fruitful focus for future research might be to use psychometrics  to 
identify whether instances of embodied cognition do or do not share common structure.   
To conclude, our results suggest that embodiment, at least in the model instance of the 
rubber hand illusion studied here, is a genuine but complex experience with a common structure, 
and identifiable subcomponents.  For example, we clearly dissociated “what” and “where” 
aspects of embodiment by identifying dissociable components of ownership and perceived 
location of the rubber hand.  Nevertheless, ownership and location along with the sense of 
agency grouped together in the omnibus PCA, suggesting that these three components of 
embodiment, while dissociable in a focused analysis, form a coherent cluster of experience.  This 
experiential link between the senses of ownership and agency belies the traditional view that 
these are distinct (Gallagher, 2000; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Gallagher, 2007b).  Most psychological models of conscious experience focus on simple qualia.  
These models, however, are not appropriate for composite, background states of experience such 
as embodiment.  By decomposing such experiences psychometrically, we have made it possible 
to search for the neural correlates of specific subcomponents of bodily self-consciousness, and 
made an initial step towards uniting experimental and phenomenological research (cf. Gallagher 
& Brøsted Sørensen, 2006). 
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Footnotes 
 
1) The somatoparaphrenic patient studied by Rode and colleagues (1992) is perhaps also 
relevant in this light.  She at one point claimed that her left arm was not hers “because it’s too 
heavy”. 
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Figure Captions 
 
1) Component scores for the primary PCA. Error bars are one SEM. 
 
2) Component scores for the secondary PCA unpacking the embodiment of rubber hand 
component. Error bars are one SEM. 
